Jashleen, Chandigarh University In today’s messy world of divorces, husbands and sometimes wives are quick to demand DNA tests on their kids to “prove” infidelity – turning courtrooms into paternity battlegrounds that scar children for life.
APARNA AJINKYA FIRODIA vs AJINKYA ARUN FIRODIA
Enter the Supreme Court’s sharp ruling in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia (C.A. No. 1308/2023 INSC 146, 20 February 2023), by Justices V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna. It slams the door on such fishing trips, doubling down on Section 112 of the Evidence Act’s rock-solid presumption that kids born in wedlock are legitimate.
At its core, the judgment prioritises the child’s privacy and dignity under Article 21, far above flimsy parental accusations. Courts can’t order tests without solid prima facie proof to bust that presumption.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Aparna and Ajinkya Firodia, prominent figures in Pune’s auto industry (think Force Motors), got married in the past and had two children together. Their younger son, Master Arjun, called ‘X’ to shield his identity, was born right in the thick of the marriage, around 2015, with zero gaps that’d raise eyebrows under law. No one’s disputing the timeline; the kid was very much a product of wedlock. But by 2017, cracks showed big time. Ajinkya stormed into Pune’s Family Court (Mat. Petition No. P.A. 639/2017) seeking divorce under Sections 13(1)(i) and (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, cruelty and adultery, his big claims.
What fueled his fire? A batch of WhatsApp chats he swore showed Aparna stepping out, plus a private DNA test he’d secretly run on the boy, which shockingly excluded him as the biological father. No court oversight on that test, mind you, just some lab report he waved around. On August 12, 2021, Family Court Judge Vedashri Y. Patwardhan bought it hook, line, and sinker. She ordered an official DNA swab on little Arjun from a government lab, and here’s the kicker: if Aparna didn’t play ball, the court would slam her with an “adverse inference” per Section 114(h), Evidence Act, translation, assume she’s guilty of adultery and the kid’s not his. Heavy stuff for a toddler.
Aparna didn’t take that lying down. She dashed to Bombay High Court (Writ Petition No. 7077 of 2021), arguing it trashed Section 112’s ironclad legitimacy presumption and stomped on the child’s privacy rights under Article 21. But on November 22, 2021, Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and S.M. Modak upheld the order, dubbing the private DNA and chats “prima facie” proof strong enough to poke holes in the presumption. No dice on non-access evidence, they said, just enough smoke for a test.
Out of options, Aparna fired off a Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 1308/2023). What started as a gritty family feud was about to hit national headlines on kid rights versus courtroom truth hunts.
ISSUES RAISED
- Does insufficient prima facie material justify a court-ordered DNA test rebutting Section 112?
- Validity of adverse inference (Section 114(h)) for test refusal in adultery claims?
- Balancing parental rights vs. the child’s Article 21 privacy/dignity.
CONTENTIONS RAISED BY BOTH PARTIES
The appellant-wife, Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, mounted a robust defence anchored in the statutory fortress of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. She contended that this provision erects a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for any child born during wedlock or within 280 days of its dissolution, rebuttable only by compelling proof of the husband’s non-access to the wife at the relevant time, a threshold unmet here, as no such evidence surfaced. The private DNA report and WhatsApp communications, she argued, lacked authentication, cross-examination, or judicial scrutiny, rendering them inadmissible to dismantle the presumption; moreover, subjecting the minor child to invasive testing would infringe his fundamental rights to privacy and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution, transforming family proceedings into unwarranted inquisitions.
In stark opposition, the respondent-husband, Ajinkya Arun Firodia, asserted that his evidence, comprising the private DNA results excluding his paternity and incriminating WhatsApp exchanges, constituted sufficient prima facie material to warrant a court-directed test, invoking judicial discretion under the Evidence Act to unearth the truth in adultery allegations under Sections 13(1)(i) and (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
He urged the application of Section 114(h), positing that refusal to comply merited an adverse inference of guilt, thereby justifying the Family Court’s and High Court’s orders as essential for matrimonial justice.
SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS AND RATIO DECIDENDI
Delivering the judgment on 20 February 2023, Justices V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna meticulously dissected the interplay between statutory presumptions and judicial discretion, commencing with a resounding reaffirmation of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
This provision, they underscored, mandates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for any child born during the continuance of a valid marriage or within 280 days of its dissolution, where the husband remains alive, rebuttable solely by proof of non-access at the time of conception. The Court characterised this as a “strong and compelling” safeguard, rooted in public policy to shield children from the vagaries of parental discord, not to be displaced by mere suspicion or unverified assertions.
On the pivotal issue of DNA testing, the Bench laid down a stringent criterion: courts may direct such invasive procedures only upon “sufficient prima facie material” that cogently displaces the presumption, material far beyond the respondent’s unauthenticated private DNA report or unexamined WhatsApp exchanges, which lacked cross-verification or judicial authentication.
Drawing from Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B. (1993) 3 SCC 418, the Court cautioned against routine orders, deeming them impermissible “fishing expeditions” that trample child welfare. Equally firm was the rejection of Section 114(h)’s mechanical invocation: no adverse inference of adultery could automatically flow from a party’s refusal to subject the child to testing, as the child’s interests reign supreme over matrimonial vendettas.
Elevating the discourse to constitutional dimensions, the judgment enshrined legitimacy as an integral facet of the minor’s right to privacy and dignity under Article 21, observing that unwarranted probes inflict indelible stigma and psychological trauma.
Distinguishing Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (2014) 9 SCC 511, where robust blood tests tipped the scales, the Court held the evidence here fell woefully short. In a poignant obiter, it declared: “Children have a right not to have their legitimacy questioned frivolously. This is part of their right to privacy. Judicial caution was urged: family courts must prioritise the child’s unassailable status over scientific curiosity absent compelling necessity.
The operative order allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts’ directives, imposed ₹1 lakh costs on the respondent, and left him free to pursue divorce via alternate evidence. This ratio not only fortifies Section 112 but recalibrates family jurisprudence towards child-centric equity.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Aparna Firodia judgment marks a doctrinal pivot in Indian jurisprudence on Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872, steering from the relatively permissive stance in early precedents, where courts occasionally favoured scientific evidence over statutory presumptions, to a markedly restrictive paradigm.
Whereas Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik (2014) 9 SCC 511 permitted DNA results to override legitimacy in exceptional cases, the present ruling reins in such interventions, prioritising the provision’s public policy moorings in child protection and social stability. This evolution underscores a maturing judicial reticence against forensic overreach in familial matters.
Its merits are compelling: by demanding “sufficient prima facie material,” the decision erects a bulwark against speculative “fishing expeditions,” safeguarding vulnerable minors from psychological scarring and societal stigma while curbing the tactical misuse of paternity probes in acrimonious divorces.
Yet, critics discern limitations; in genuine non-paternity scenarios, the high rebuttal threshold may obstruct biological truth, complicating maintenance or inheritance claims and posing evidentiary hurdles in an era of reliable DNA technology.
Comparatively, it resonates with the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act, 1998, which balances privacy (Article 8 ECHR) against public interest, often denying tests absent compelling justification, unlike the United States’ more liberal disestablishment suits under Uniform Parentage Act principles, emphasising genetic reality. Through a gender prism, the ruling disproportionately shields mothers from unsubstantiated infidelity slurs, mitigating gendered vulnerabilities in matrimonial litigation, though it invites debate on equity for aggrieved fathers.
IMPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
The Aparna Firodia ruling recalibrates family court practice, imposing elevated thresholds for DNA testing that compel judges to adopt a rigorously child-centric lens, sidelining parental vendettas in favour of minors’ unassailable legitimacy. Lower courts must now demand authenticated evidence, curtailing reflexive orders that once plagued matrimonial proceedings.
Post-2023, its influence endures: 2025 Supreme Court decisions, accessible via the SCI API, invoke it for judicial restraint in paternity disputes, reinforcing precedential weight. Broader ripples extend to custody and maintenance litigation, harmonising with POCSO Act safeguards and evolving privacy jurisprudence under Article 21. For practitioners, the message is unequivocal: eschew private tests for court-vetted proof, reshaping evidentiary strategies in divorce arenas.
CONCLUSION
In essence, Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia buttresses Section 112 as an impregnable shield for children ensnared in matrimonial crossfire, subordinating forensic quests to presumptive legitimacy and constitutional privacy. While lauded for equity, it exposes gaps warranting legislative intervention, perhaps codified DNA protocols balancing science with welfare. Looking ahead, this precedent charts a judicious path, harmonising truth-seeking with human dignity amid advancing forensics, ensuring family law evolves as protector, not inquisitor.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS)
What are the key facts of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia?
Aparna and Ajinkya married in 2005 under Hindu rites, with sons born in 2007 (Hridaan) and 2012/2013 (Arjun). In 2016, Ajinkya discovered phone messages suggesting Aparna’s adultery with Kshitij Bafna and conducted a private DNA test showing 0% paternity probability for Arjun. He filed for divorce in 2017 under HMA Sections 13(1)(i)/(ia), seeking court-ordered DNA testing; Family Court Pune (12.08.2021) and Bombay HC (22.11.2021) directed the test with adverse inference under Evidence Act Section 114(h) on refusal.
What were the primary legal issues before the Supreme Court?
(i) Can courts mandate DNA testing to rebut the strong presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 Evidence Act without prima facie proof of non-access during conception?
(ii) Does refusal to undergo testing justify adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (h), considering the child’s privacy/welfare under Article 21?
What was the Supreme Court’s holding in the case?
Appeal allowed; DNA direction set aside as unauthenticated messages and private DNA reports failed to rebut Section 112’s mandatory presumption. No adverse inference for refusal; child’s right to legitimacy and best interests paramount over parental allegations, distinguishing from Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik.
How does the judgment interpret Section 112 Evidence Act?
Creates a robust, class-wide presumption for children born during a valid marriage (or within 280 days post-dissolution) unless the husband proves non-access; DNA evidence alone is insufficient without foundational facts, prioritising the child’s emotional stability over biological “truth.”
What are the broader implications for matrimonial and family law?
Deters “fishing expeditions” via invasive tests in divorce/adultery claims (post-IPC Section 497 decriminalisation); elevates minors’ privacy/Article 21 rights, urging judicial caution on private evidence and reinforcing a welfare-centric approach in custody disputes.
How has the ruling shaped subsequent jurisprudence?
Frequently cited to deny DNA orders absent compelling non-access proof (e.g., custody cases); clarifies courts’ discretion under Article 142 for child-focused justice, influencing HMA proceedings by limiting rebuttal thresholds.
REFERENCES
https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/9691/9691_2022_15_1501_42221_Judgement_20-Feb-2023.pdf
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1259126
https://www.dnaforensics.in/court-admissible-legal-dna-paternity-test-in-india
